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Transfrontier Pollution: The Economic Model and Its Associated Games
The Basic Economic Model
Currently, much of the economic analysis of international agreements on transfrontier pollution is based on a model whose components are the following:
(i) N = { iji = 1, ... , n} , the set of countries concerned by the analysis, the countries being n in number, each indexed by i;
(ii) For each country i:
(a) Quantities Ei � 0 of pollutants emitted by the economic agents of country i, per unit of time. Ei is a scalar if the analysis bears on one pollutant only, as will be the case in the present paper. 1 (b) Quantities Qi � 0 of ambient pollutants present in country i's environment, per unit of time. As for the emissions, Qi is a scalar if only one pollutant is considered; in an analysis with several pollutants it would be a vector.
( c ) A transfer fu nction
where E = (E 1 , ... , En) , that describes the physical, chemical, and/or biolog ical processes whereby the amounts E of pollutant(s) emitted in all countries get transformed into the quantities Qi of ambient pollutants present in country i. This function is assumed to be nondecreasing in each of its arguments. The fact that Qi is formulated here as being dependent on current emissions only restricts the analysis to flow pollutants, as opposed to stock pollutants.
( d) An abatement cost fu nction, Ci ( Ei) , expressing the costs (monetary and pos sibly nonmonetary) incurred by the polluting agents of country i when their aggregate emissions are restricted to the amount Ei· This function is assumed to be decreasing (CI < 0), a property reflecting the natural assumption that reducing emissions (i.e., abating) is costly.
(e) A damage cost fu nction Di( Qi) , expressing the costs (monetary as well as non monetary) incurred by the economic agents of country i as a result of the ambient pollutants Qi they are exposed to. This function is assumed to be nondecreasing ( n: � 0). incurred by the country as a result of the joint pollutant emissions E of all countries. Notice that the variables Ej, j =/:-i, that appear as arguments of the function Ji are of the nature of an externality, exerted on country i by each one of the countries j.
(iii) Finally, the description of this international economy with pollution-henceforth summarily designated by the pair [N, (Ci, Di, Fi ) iEN]-is completed by identifying a vector E* = ( E;, ... , E�) of optimal joint emissions by the n countries, optimality being taken in the sense of minimizing the sum over all countries of both abatement and damage costs. E* is thus the solution of the optimization problem.
The Associated Games
Because of the nonexistence of a supranational authority endowed with sufficient coercive power to impose any emissions policy on the countries, the optimum just defined is only likely to be implemented on a voluntary basis, that is, in terms of joint actions that suit the interests of each one of the countries involved.
This argument, which is by now classical, motivates the recourse to game theoretic concepts for finding out whether it is at all reasonable to expect that the optimum be achieved voluntarily by the parties. Indeed, the formulation of alternative games associated with the economic model introduces behavioral assumptions on the basis of which voluntary actions can be characterized.
In this respect, the distinction offered by classical game theory between noncoopera tive and cooperative games is particularly relevant. This paper builds explicitly on such distinction (i) by characterizing as equilibria of a noncooperative game associated with the above economic model, national emission policies that only satisfy the objectives of each country; and (ii) by identifying with some solution concept for cooperative games (also associated with the economic model) policies that reflect actions taken in a coordinated way by either all the parties, or subsets of them.
Formally, (i) A noncooperative game, defined by its players set N = {iii = 1, ... , n }, by the sets Ti, i = 1, ... , n of strategies accessible to each of the players i, and by the payoffs ui that the latter achieve-and henceforth denoted by the triplet [N, (Ti) iEN, (ui) iEN]-is associated with the economic model [N, (Ci, Di, Fi) iEN] by identifying the players set with the set of countries, by defining the strategy set of each country as Ti = { Ei I Ei 2: 0} (with possibly an upper bound Ef to be defined below) , and by defining each player's payoff ui as the value -Ji of the function specified in (2) above.
(ii) A cooperative game (in characteristic function form and with transferable utility) , defined by its players set N = {iii = 1, ... , n } and the fllHC tion w( S) that associates with every subset S of Na number called the worth 2 of S-and henceforth denoted by the pair [N, w] -is similarly associated with the economic model [N, (Ci, Di, Fi) iEN] by identifying again the player set with the set of countries, and by defining the characteristic function as3 (4) Thus the worth of each coalition S is determined by some strategy vector (Ei) iE S adopted by the members of the coalition. However, remembering (1) , one notices that when S # N, this worth also depends upon the strategies (Ej)j�s adopted by the coun tries which are not members of S. As those have been left unspecified in our formulation of the function (4) , we shall have to return to this issue below when we deal in more detail with the cooperative game.
2.3

Assumptions on the Economic and Ecological Components of the Model
Precise results on voluntary behavior in this economic model can be obtained when some further assumptions are introduced on its components. Those we shall use-most of which are standard, but would deserve critical discussion-are the following:
Assumption 2: Vi, the function Ci(Ei) is strictly convex (i.e., C;' > 0) over the range ] 0, Ef [. 2or the payoff to coalition S. 3In standard game theoretic models, payoffs, whether individual as in Ui or for coalitions as in w(S), are usually supposed to be maximized by the players. As the economic model used here associates costs only with its agents, maximizing payoffs for them amounts to minimizing costs. The Arrow-Debreu type of model used in C&T94 allows for payoffs to be directly defined on the utilities of the economic agents, more in line with usual practice.
Assumption 3: 'Vi, the transfer function Qi = Fi(E) is of the linear additive form n Qi= L Ej. (6) j=l Notice that this assumption implies that Qi = Qi V i, j E N, thus making the ambient quantities of pollutant to have the characteri�tics of an international public good ( actu ally, of a public "bad") for the countries involved. 4 In view of Assumption 3, we shall often write, with some notational inconsistency, Di( Qi) as Di(E).
Assumption 4: Vi, the (nondecreasing) damage cost function Di( Qi) is convex (D�' 2: O); it is strictly increasing (D� > 0) for at least some i.
Together, Assumptions 2 to 4 imply that Vi, the total cost function Ji(E) is convex. One can then prove, as in C&T94 (Section 3):
Under the Assumptions 1-4, the optimal joint emissions vector E * is unique and in the range] 0, Ef [ Vi .
The optimum so defined is usefully characterized by the well-known first order con ditions
The Noncooperative Game and Its Nash Equilib-
The Nash Equilibrium A first form of voluntary behavior in our economic model is the one described by the familiar Nash equilibrium concept of the associated noncooperative game, namely: 
with 0 ::; aji ::; 1 and LiEN aji = 1, the externalities are directional and do not have the public good property.
Existence of this equilibrium follows from standard theorems (see e.g. FRIEDMAN 1990). It is characterized by the first order conditions D�(E) + C I(E i) = 0, i = 1, ... , n.
( 9) As these differ from the conditions (8) whereby the optimum was characterized, a Nash equilibrium is not an optimum for the economy, revealing thus that this form of voluntary behavior is incompatible with international optimality.
Notice that the conditions (9) imply (10) Furthermore, if Di( Qi) is linear, Ei is a dominant strategy for i since the first term of (9) is independent of Qi and of the vector E in that case.
A final property, formally important for our purposes below, is the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium vector E in this game, as shown in Proposition 2 of C&T94.
3.2
Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria M A .LER 1989-93 has considered stronger concepts of voluntary behavior in the framework of noncooperative games, namely the "strong Nash equilibrium" and the "coalition-proof Nash equilibrium." However, for the game [N, (Ti)iEN, (ui) iEN], it can be shown that there exists no strong Nash equilibrium, and no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is optimal, if there exists one at all. They are therefore of little use in our enquiry.
3.3
The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium With Respect to a Coalition Another aspect of the noncooperative behavior may be considered, namely the one adopted by the players outside a coalition, when a coalition forms. This is described by the following concept.
Definition 2: Given some coalition S C N, a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to Sin the game [N, (Ti)iEN, (ui) iEN], is a joint strategy E such that ( i) ( Ei )i ES minimizes I:: iE S Ji ( E), where for every j E N, j r/. S, E j = Ej as defined in (ii) , and
(ii) Vj E N\S, Ej minimizes J j(E) , where for every i E S, Ei = Ei as defined in (i) .
In C&T94 (Section 3.3) , we prove: (ii) the vector of individual emission levels at such an equilibrium is unique;
(iii) the individual emissions of the players outside the coalition are not lower than those at a Nash equilibrium;
(iv) the total emissions level is not higher than at a Nash equilibrium.
The equilibrium so defined is also characterized by the first order conditions Turning now to the cooperative part of our analysis, we first recall some terminology.
For a cooperative game [ N, w] in general, an imputation is a vector y = (y1, ... , Y n) such that I:: iEN Y i = w ( N) . Recall that for the game associated with our economic model, the worth w ( N) of the grand coalition, as defined in ( 4) , is a total cost: more precisely, it is the minimum of the aggregate total abatement and damage cost over all countries.
Here, an imputation is thus a way to share among all players the amount of this cost. In this setting, an imputation y is said to belong to the core of the game if it satisfies the conditions;
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The core of our cooperative game is thus the set of imputations having the property that to every conceivable coalition they offer to bear a share of the aggregate cost w(N) lower than the cost w(S), it would bear by itself.
To study the core of this game, we therefore shall consider in more detail, in the next two subsections, what its imputations are, as well as how its characteristic function is precisely defined.
4.2
Imputations in the Game and Monetary Transfers in the Economic Model
As was noted in Proposition 1, the minimum aggregate cost is determined by a unique joint strategy vector E* = (Er, ... , E�), yielding Ji(E*) for each i and of course L iEN Ji(E*) = w(N). The vector J(E*) = [J1 (E*), ... , Jn (E*)] is thus an imputation where each country bears itself the abatement and damage costs that E* entails for it.
Other imputations, associated with the same optimal joint strategy, can be conceived of, however, if monetary transfers between countries are introduced. Let us denote such transfers by Pi(> 0 if the transfer is paid by i, < 0 if it is received by it) . Then impu tations in the cooperative game associated with our economy can be written as vectors y P = ( y f , ... , y �,) defined by yf=Ji(E*) +Pi , i=l, ... ,n, and the condition With the condition just stated, we have indeed that L iEN yf = w(N).
It was observed at the end of Subsection 2.2 that for arguments S =/= N of the char acteristic function associated with our economic model, the function involves variables that represent strategic choices made by players who are not members of S. Because of this feature-a typical one when a cooperative game is associated with economies with externalities, such as ours-the characteristic function ( 4) should specify explicitly what the actions are both of the members of S and of the other players. To this effect, we shall consider the following two alternatives:
(i) The cooperative game [ N, wa] , defined by the characteristic function of the form
(Ei)iES iES (Recall that EJ was defined in Assumption 1).
This function reflects the assumption that when a coalition forms, its worth is what it gets when the players outside the coalition choose the strategy which is worst for it-i.e., pollute up to EJ in our model. This form has been often used in economic models with beneficial externalities and/or public goods production (see, e.g. FOLEY 1970, SCARF 1971, and re cently CHANDER 1993) where it is a natural one because the "worst" strategy of nonmembers of S is simply no action in such cases.
With detrimental externalities as we have here, it is less natural to assume such an attitude: why should the nonmembers of S act in this way? And for the members of S, why should they necessarily expect the worst and behave in a minimax way?
The first of these questions is also raised by MA.LER 1989-1993 in his discussion of cooperative games of transfrontier pollution, all the more rightly so that he does not assume in the economic model an upper bound such as our EJ for the individual emissiods. The worst then becomes infinite amounts of emissions, which is hardly credible.
While Maler concludes by dismissing the tool of the characteristic function, and as a consequence the core concept which is built on it5, we choose to propose instead to consider the following alternative:
(ii) The cooperative game [N, w1] , defined by the characteristic function of the form w1(S) = min Ji(E) where, if S-::/= N, Ej = Ej"ij E N\S.
(E;);ES ( Recall that Ej was defined in part (ii) of the definition of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition).
The function w1 is to be called the "partial agreement" charactPristic function. \Ve assume here that when S forms, the other players break-up into singletons, and act noncooperatively so as to reach an equilibrium in their best individual interest, given S.
It is thus not assumed that they do the worst; nor is it assumed, as in the concepts of strong and coalition-proof equilibria, that they do not react6 to the actions of S.
r'Anothcr argument ma.de .is that. wit.h no IH1u11ds on I.hp h!'lt1tl'iur of player�; not i11 S, tlw worth of coalitions different from N can be reduced to zero, which renders them powerless. The core then becomes equal to the set of imputations, and the concept brings no more information than optimality.
6CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993, in a model with identical agents, assume instead that when S forms and achieves the aggregate payoff w(S), if some i E S leaves S, the coalition S\{i} remains formed. (They show that then, it may be better for i to leave S; and as this ad, ; antage grows with the size of coalitions, they conclude that only small coalitions can prevail, and N will never form).
In view of property (10) and of Proposition 2, one has that for each S, w1'(S) 2: wcx(S). This implies that the core of the game [ N, w1'], i. e. , the "1-core" is, if nonempty, contained in the "a-core", and possibly smaller.
5
An Imputation in the "1-Core" of the Coopera tive Game
As it is well known that many cooperative games may have an empty core, the concept of a 1-core imputation is only useful if we can establish its existence, at least for the cooperative game [ N, w1'] that we have associated with the economic model. As far as the a-core is concerned, it was shown to be nonempty in games with externalities by SCARF 1971 as well as in the version given by LAFFONT 1977 (p. 102) of the SHAPLEY and SHUBIK 1989 well-known "garbage game"7•
We proceed in this section in a constructive way, that is, by exhibiting an imputa tion for which we show that it has the property of belonging to the 1-core. Economic interpretations are given in the next section.
Our result is not fully general, though, as we obtain it only under two alternative additional assumptions: either linearity of the damage cost functions Di, or identical abatement cost functions Ci for all countries i. We limit ourselves here to the first case, and refer the reader to C&T94 for the second one.
Theorem. Let E* = (Et, ... , E� ) be the (unique) optimal joint emissions policy. Un der Assumptions 1-3 and the linearity of all the damage cost functions Di, the imputation y* = (y r , ... , y�) defined by where and
7Laffont also shows that for the garbage game, the emptiness claimed by Shapley and Shubik applies in fact to the /3-core. For a game like ours, the a-core and the /3-core coincide.
belongs to the core of the game [ N, w"Y].
Proof (a) It is easily verified that y * is an imputation, i. e. , that iEN iEN
(b) Suppose now that the imputation y * is not in the core. Then, there would exist a coalition S and a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S, E = (E1, .. . , En),
Notice first that Vi E N\S, Ei = E i in this partial agreement equilibrium because Ei is a dominant strategy under linearity of the damage cost functions. Moreover, from the first order conditions that characterize a partial agreement equilibrium one has V i E S, Ei � E;.
Consider now the alternative imputation y defined by where the transfers are of the form
N iEN iEN
If we can show that and that then, given (14) , the imputation 'f) induces an aggregate cost for all countries which is lower than w( N)-an impossibility that proves the theorem.
To show (i) , let us write
iES iES iES
where the last line has been obtained by adding and subtracting Li ES Di(E) to the previous one, and use has been made of the linearity of the functions Di as well as . of the form (6) of the transfer functions. In this expression, a negative value of the term within square brackets can be derived from properties of the optimum E*, of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition and from the strict convexity of the abatement cost functions Ci .
To show (ii) , starting from the fact that and Y i Ci(E;) + Di(E*) + Pi
it is sufficient to show that
N iEN iEN
But this derives from the characterization of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition with linear functions Di, namely Ei = Ei, a dominant strategy V i E N\S, and LiEN Ci(Ei) 2: LiEN Ci(Ei) according to Proposition 2.
Q. E. D.
I
Finally the remark made at the end of Section 4 allows us to further state:
Corollary. The imputation y * also belongs to the core of the game [N, w0'].
6 Conclusion: Economic Interpretation of the Pro posed "'Y-core" Solution.
6.1
The Cost Sharing Formula
As announced in the introduction, the essence of the paper is formula (13) , which specifies a (net) monetary transfer for each country. Its "core" virtue lies in the fact that, given the international optimum E*, and the cost (both of abatement and of damage) Ji ( E*) that each country has to bear to implement it, the transfers yield to each country or group of countries an effective net cost lower than the one they would bear under any other arrangement, including under strictly autarkic Nash equilibrium.
Each individual transfer consists of two parts: a payment to each country i that covers its increase in cost between the Nash equilibrium and the optimum (first squared bracket of formula (13) ), and a payment by country i of a proportion DUD'rv of the total of these differences across all countries (second squared bracket of formula (13) ). Of course, full knowledge of the functions Di and Ci is required for computing these amounts. We already had proposed elsewhere (CHANDER and TULKENS 1992) that an international agency be set up to handle these computations and payments. Recall that as they are specified, the transfers break even.
Notice that if D� = 0 for some country (because it would not be concerned as a recipient-or would allege not to be-of the kind of transfrontier pollution under dis cussion) , while its abatement cost would be positive, that country only receives the first component of the transfer formula, for the abatement it does; but it pays nothing to the others; this leaves it at an effective cost level equal to the one at the Nash equilibrium. In general, though, according to the second component of the formula, the contribu tion made by a country to the other ones is a fraction of the aggregate abatement costs (above the Nash equilibrium) equal to its relative marginal damage cost to the sum of all countries' marginal damage costs, DU D'rv. In other words, each country's contribution is determined by the relative intensity of its preferences for the public good component of the problem.
6.2
On the Cooperative and Voluntary Nature of Agreements
Supported by Core Theoretic Considerations
A core imputation is to be interpreted as a proposal made to all players for sharing w(N), having the property that no coalition S can improve upon it for the benefit of its members by means of the payoff it can secure them. Because of this property, it is claimed that no coalition S is in a position to object to it.
A core proposal is thus (i) a cooperative one, because it involves the all players set, and (ii) one that should entail voluntary agreement, because it is based on an explicit proof that neither the absence of agreement, nor any other agreement can do better for any of the parties involved.
These seem to be strong virtues for designing the cost sharing arrangements in an international treaty.
6.3
On the Role of International Transfers
The strategic role of monetary transfers appears clearly as soon as one realizes that polluting countries with nonzero abatement cost and weak preferences for removal of ambient pollutants never have an interest in cooperating towards abatement (let alone an optimal one) , because the costs are higher to them than the benefits. This is reflected, by the way, in the two following remarks: (i) in our game, the core is empty in general if transfers are not allowed; and (ii) when all players are identical, the (unique) core imputation is the one without transfers. It is thus, in a sense, the diversity of the agents that commands transfers when strategic considerations are at stake.
6.4
On the Linearity Assumption on the Damage Cost Func tion While restrictive at a general level, the linearity assumption on preferences (i.e., damage costs) may be seen as a mild one in the specific context oftransfrontier pollution. On the one hand, at the empirical level, these functions are indeed extremely difficult to estimate. Mainly for that reason, M A LER 1989-93 and several of his followers have been satisfied with that assumption, all the more that, as he shows, it can be given a useful role in a Nash equilibrium situation.
Another argument is that the optimum may lie far away from the situation prevail ing at the time the negotiations begin, thereby increasing uncertainties. Techniques of economic computation have therefore been devised to move towards the optimum in suc cessive steps (a recent example is given in GERMAIN, TOINT and TULKENS 1994) . For the "local" information required to apply these techniques, linear functions ( with parameters possibly varying over time) are surely not inappropriate.
